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HISTORICAL RECORD / DOSSIER 42 OF 50

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FILE FCP-42 HISTORICAL CASE FILE

The LCD panel price-fixing cartel

ASSESSMENT: Supplier price coordination was established; precise consumer overcharges require careful market-specific estimation.

Documented findings, economic interpretation and unresolved claims are assessed separately.

Claim under review

The question is whether display-panel manufacturers coordinated prices and supply to raise costs for computer and television makers.

The U.S. cases focused on meetings and price agreements for TFT-LCD panels used in named products. Pleas and trial records vary by firm; a panel supplier’s participation does not automatically establish that every downstream computer or television maker knowingly joined the agreement.

Context and timeline

Panel producers held secret meetings and exchanged price information in Asia and the United States. DOJ investigations produced guilty pleas and fines; the European Commission also fined suppliers, followed by consumer and purchaser claims.

Panel invoices and contract pricing offer a better overcharge measure than retail sticker prices, because manufacturers and retailers absorb or pass through costs differently. Product mix, panel generation and rapidly falling technology costs complicate comparisons over time.

Primary records and formal findings

DOJ pleas and EU decisions document agreed prices and company participation for specified panels and dates; findings do not cover every maker or screen market.

The conspiracy findings are narrower and firmer than estimates of final consumer harm. Distinguish the existence and duration of an agreement from any damages model used in later private litigation.

Independent economic evidence

Hastings and other competition analyses consider pass-through and overcharge effects in downstream products; panel prices and procurement data allow independent testing.

The agreement is a legal finding; downstream pass-through is an empirical question. Product-level contracts, competing suppliers and falling technology costs are necessary to estimate consumer effects.

Counter-evidence and limitations

The degree to which cartel costs reached retail consumers varies by product, contracts and timing. Later settlements or damages awards can use different assumptions and are not direct proof of every household’s loss.

Falsifiable checks and assessment

Compare panel invoices, benchmark prices and downstream retail prices before, during and after agreement; estimate pass-through by product and identify unaffected suppliers.

Assessment: Supplier price coordination was established; precise consumer overcharges require careful market-specific estimation.

Sources and evidentiary notes

  1. U.S. DOJ, LCD panel cartel criminal case releases (2008–12)Pleas establish conduct by named firms. Its findings are limited to the parties, conduct, dates or mandate covered by that record.
  2. European Commission, LCD glass and panel cartel decisions (2010)Regulatory decisions specify market scope and duration.
  3. U.S. v. AU Optronics, trial and appellate records (2012–15)Court record tests U.S. jurisdiction and evidence. Its findings are limited to the parties, conduct, dates or mandate covered by that record.

Historical research only; not investment or legal advice.